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ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates, from a feminist economics perspective, the widely discussed trend of increased inequality in Canada. The paper 
highlights the neoclassical economic concepts underlying the measurement of inequality trends, and it examines how these concepts 
fail to fully reflect women's contributions to welfare and their welfare positions relative to those of men. 
RESUME 
Cet article evalue, a partirde la perspective economique feministe, la tendance grandementdiscutee de I'inegalite croissanteau Canada. 
Cet article souligne les concepts economiques neoclassiques qui sont a la base de la mesure de la tendance vers I'inegalite, et il etudie 
comment ces concepts ne refletent pas totatelement les contributions que les femmes ont faites au bien-etre social et leurs positions de 
bien-etre social en comparaison a celles des hommes 
INTRODUCTION 
An increase in inequality of welfare in 
Canada, as well as in other industrialized countries, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, has been widely 
reported in the economics literature (Anton Allahar 
and James Cote 1998; Charles Beach and George 
Slotsve 1996; Garnett Picot 1997; Peter Gottschalk 
and Timothy Smeeding 1997) and more popular 
media. Increased inequality has implications for 
government social policy and, as Gottschalk and 
Smeeding (1997, 675) state, "[c]oncerns about 
earnings inequality and joblessness have moved to 
the top of the social agenda in many OECD 
countries." 
This paper confirms the finding of an 
increase in inequality, as measured by neoclassical 
economic concepts, and fully agrees that it is an 
important trend reflecting one outcome of economic 
restructuring and globalization with serious social 
and economic implications. I argue, however, that 
conventional assumptions underlying inequality 
estimates are flawed ideologically. As a result, first, 
once the assumptions are rejected, the estimates of 
increased welfare inequality cannot be easily 
interpreted, and second, they fail to capture gender 
dimensions of the changing distribution of welfare. 
In the following section, trends in 
Canadian inequality during the 1980s and early 
1990s are documented using data from the Survey 
of Consumer Finances (1981,1989, and 1994) and 
published Statistics Canada sources. Each of the 
next three sections addresses a separate assumption 
implicit in concepts underlying the conventional 
inequality estimates. These assumptions are (i) 
income is a suitable measure for welfare, (ii) the 
household is a cooperative and sharing unit, and 
(iii) work is compensated by the wage. Each 
section outlines the assumption, provides a critique 
of the assumption, examines the implications for 
estimates of inequality at a point in time and 
changes over time, and explores the gender 
dimension of these inequality trends. The critique 
of neoclassical economic assumptions draws upon 
the feminist economics literature and selected 
insights from Michele Pujol's (1992) book, 
Feminism and Anti-Feminism in Early Economic 
Thought. Pujol's work is particularly illuminating 
because the concepts of early influential 
economists continue to be pervasive today, and 
they are so widely applied that many economists 
fail to even recognize that conceptual choices are 
being made. A conclusion is offered in the final 
section. 
TRENDS IN INEQUALITY OF INCOME 
Economists typically measure welfare by 
money income, and consequently, the distribution 
of welfare is measured by the distribution of income 
where income is defined either as household income 
or individual employment earnings. Estimates of 
both types of inequality are presented in Table 1, 
using a conventional statistical summary indicator 
of inequality, the Gini Coefficient.' Among 
households, annual market income inequality 
decreased in the 1970s and then increased 13 
percent between 1981 and 1994, based upon the 
percentage change in the Gini Coefficient estimates, 
as shown in Table 1 (Column 1). Here, household 
market income is defined as labour market earnings, 
self-employment earnings, private pension benefits, 
and investment dividends, accruing to all household 
members combined. Notice that the increase in 
household market income inequality is greater than 
the increase in household post-tax and transfer 
income, which increased only 1 percent between 
1981 and 1994 (see Table 1, Column 2). Therefore, 
the government tax and transfer system 
redistributed income in Canada in a manner which 
dampened the effects of increased inequality arising 
from market-oriented forces, such as changes within 
the labour market. The increase in household 
market income inequality has received so much 
attention from policy-makers, academics, and the 
popular press in major part because the increase in 
the 1980s contrasted so sharply with the trends in 
the 1970s, during which time inequality actually 
declined. 
Among all workers (men and women 
combined), earnings inequality increased about 6 
percent between 1981 and 1994 (see Table 1, 
Column 3). Earnings are defined as annual gross, 
cash wages and salaries from a paid job, before any 
deductions, such as pension plan contributions and 
income tax; and the population of all workers is 
defined as individuals, aged 17 to 64 years, with a 
paid job and excludes individuals who are 
exclusively self-employed. As shown in Table 2, 
however, there are substantial differences in 
inequality once the workforce is broken down by 
gender and work status. For example, over the 
period 1981 to 1994, for all women workers, 
earnings inequality remained quite stable, whereas 
for all men workers, earnings inequality increased 
by 14 percent (see Table 2, Panel A, Columns 3 
and 4, respectively). The relative stability of 
earnings inequality among all women workers is 
due in large part to the increase in hours worked 
by women working part-time which helps to off-
set the increase in hourly wage inequality (see, for 
example, Rene Morissette, John Myles, and 
Garnett Picot 1994). Notice, however, that 
earnings inequality increased by a greater extent 
among women working full-time/full-year 
compared to all women workers, indicating 
increased divisions among full-time/full-year 
women workers (see Table 2, Panel A, Column 3 
compared to Panel B, Column 3). While the gender 
earnings gap for both all workers and full-
time/full-year workers has declined between 1981 
and 19942, notice that i) the gap is still large even 
after almost four decades of continued increases in 
female labour force participation, and ii) the gap 
has declined in part because male median earnings 
did not increase over this period. 
Having briefly documented the rise in 
inequality, both in terms of household income and 
individual earnings, we turn now to examine 
whether this conventional, neoclassical economic 
approach to measuring inequality fully captures 
trends in inequality. 
INCOME IS A SUITABLE MEASURE FOR 
WELFARE? 
As noted above, trends in the distribution 
of welfare are measured by the distribution of 
income because of the assumption that income 
reflects access to goods and services in the 
marketplace and these in turn generate welfare. 
However, in the feminist economics literature, it 
has been recognized, at least since the domestic 
labour debates in the 1960s, that goods and 
services produced and consumed within the 
household also contribute to welfare.3 
Equating income with welfare is so 
prevalent in neoclassical economics today, that 
many economists would not even realize that this 
reflects a conceptual choice and a choice which is 
ideologically biased against women. Pujol's (1992) 
analysis is useful because it demonstrates that early 
influential economists recognized the inconsistency 
(which is not discussed today) of only including as 
economic those activities which receive direct 
monetary payment, although they chose to resolve 
the inconsistency by ignoring the work of women. 
For example, Adam Smith (writing in the late 
1700s), notes the value of women's reproductive 
work of bearing and rearing children and future 
workers to the "wealth of nations;" however, as 
Pujol (1992, 21) writes, women's economic 
contributions were then "relegated to a trivial status, 
if not made altogether non-existent in the minds of 
the theoreticians of capitalism." Marshall, writing 
one hundred and fifty years after Adam Smith in the 
1930s, similarly recognizes the value of women's 
work to capitalist society as mothers and 
housewives, butthen defines productive labour only 
as any activities which contribute to "income" 
(Pujol 1992,132). Similarly, for Pigou (in the 1920s 
and 1930s), non-market reproductive work is not 
conceptualized as contributing to the nation's 
economic welfare since economic welfare is defined 
as "that part of social welfare that can be brought 
directly or indirectly into relation with the 
measuring rod of money" (Pigou 1960, 11; quoted 
in Pujol 1992, 169, emphasis added by Pujol). 
Despite the flexibility of this definition to cover 
activities which potentially could have a monetary 
outcome, Pigou "chooses to restrict his attention to 
economic activity which directly generates a 
monetary outcome" and thus,"... excludes women's 
non-market work from inclusion in the National 
Dividend" (Pujol 1992, 169). 
Several recent studies demonstrate that the 
amount of unpaid work in Canadian society is 
enormous; and here, unpaid work is defined as work 
householders do by and for themselves, including 
domestic chores, looking after children, shopping, 
volunteer work, and helping friends, relatives, and 
others (Statistics Canada 1995). For example, in 
1992, on average, females and males (aged 15 years 
and older) contributed, respectively, 1,482 and 832 
hours of unpaid work annually. For comparison, 
note that a job involving a full-time/full-year 
commitment requires about 1,920 hours of work 
(40 hours/week x 48 weeks/year). The amount of 
unpaid work performed is even larger for some 
groups such as women and men with children, who 
provide, on average, respectively, 2,024 and 1,090 
hours annually (Statistics Canada 1995, Table 
4.1); and so women with children provide more 
hours of unpaid work than the hours required in a 
full-time job. 
An alternative way to assess the 
magnitude of unpaid work is to examine the value 
of goods and services provided by unpaid labour 
relative to a well-known economic aggregate, such 
as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 4 In 1992, 
for example, the value of goods and services 
produced by unpaid labour ranged from 32 to 54 
percent of GDP, where the range depends upon the 
valuation method (Statistics Canada 1995, Table 
1.1). 
Regardless of whether unpaid labour is 
measured in terms of hours or value, the 
contribution of unpaid labour to welfare is large, 
and consequently, estimates of average income 
understate average welfare in society. Further, 
using average income to measure welfare 
understates women's contribution to welfare. For 
example, in 1992 women provided between 58 and 
65 percent of the value of unpaid work and 65 
percent of all the unpaid hours of work (Statistics 
Canada 1995, Table 4.6 and p. 44, respectively). 
While the estimates of hours and value of unpaid 
work are important in making women's welfare 
contributions visible, some feminist economists 
have recognized that these estimates fail to capture 
the caring aspects of much of women's work, both 
paid and unpaid, which cannot be purchased (see, 
for example, Himmelweit 1995 and Nancy Folbre 
1995). Caring labour can be both paid and unpaid 
labour and refers to, as Nancy Folbre (1995, 75) 
writes, "labour undertaken out of affection or a 
sense of responsibility for other people, with no 
expectation of immediate pecuniary reward." 
What has not been well studied is the 
impact of unpaid labour on the distribution of 
welfare. To estimate the distribution of welfare 
from both income and the value of unpaid work 
would ideally require observations of income and 
unpaid labour for the same individual or household. 
While we know how unpaid work varies among 
certain groups - for example, by employment status, 
and family composition - we do not have 
information on the amount of unpaid labour based 
on income level. 
Despite the lack of ideal data, some studies 
have estimated a variable referred to as "extended 
income" for each household. Two studies conclude 
that, at a given point in time, extended income is 
distributed more equally than monetary income 
alone. For example, in the UK, including the 
imputed value of government non-cash benefits 
(such as health and education) and unpaid time 
available for the home production of goods and 
services results in substantially lower estimates of 
inequality, compared to the usual income inequality 
estimates, at a given point in time (Stephen Jenkins 
and Nigel O'Leary 1994). This result occurs because 
the percentage of extended income in low-income 
households due to unpaid labour is greater than for 
high-income households. The same conclusion is 
reached by Iulie Aslaksen and Charlotte Koren 
(1996) who report, for Norway, that the inclusion of 
the value of unpaid domestic labour with income 
results in reducing the estimates of inequality of 
household welfare. 
The conclusion that welfare is actually 
distributed more equally than income should, 
however, be treated with some caution. First, unpaid 
labour time may be less valuable to households with 
low income since, as even Becker recognized, 
unpaid labour needs to be combined with purchased 
goods and services in order to produce welfare 
generating goods and services. Second, even if an 
increase in unpaid labour dampens inequality, we 
must remember other factors, such as the benefits 
arising from wealth, which if included would lead 
to even greater estimates of inequality.5 Although 
there are no such relative estimates, it is unlikely 
that the equalizing effects of unpaid labour would 
outweigh the unequalizing effects of wealth. Third, 
estimates of extended income consider only the 
benefits of the unpaid labour which accrue to 
household members and do not consider the costs 
to the individuals, primarily women, who provide 
the unpaid labour. The loss of a job and that 
income allows or forces people to provide more 
unpaid labour which generates welfare, and this 
serves to dampen the rise in inequality of welfare. 
We cannot conclude, however, given the three 
statements above, that the loss of the job therefore 
imposes a smaller cost and is not a policy concern. 
On average, there has been little change 
in the total work burdens (paid plus unpaid work) 
of men and women (Status of Women Canada 
1997,26). We know that, on average, women have 
increased their amount of paid work, both in terms 
of actually participating in paid work and the hours 
of paid work (see, respectively, Statistics Canada 
1994, Table 1.1 and Morissette et al. 1994) and 
decreased the amount of unpaid work, from 1,520 
to 1,482 annual hours between 1981 and 1992 
(Statistics Canada 1995, Table 4.11). For men, on 
average, the amount of paid work has declined due 
to early retirement and increased school enrolment 
and the amount of unpaid work has increased from 
797 to 831 annual hours. 
The estimates of average work burdens of 
men and women, however, mask considerable 
diversity among households. For example, women 
with children who work full-time in the labour 
market still perform the majority of household 
tasks, so their total work burdens will be greater 
than their partners' (Katherine Marshall 1993, 
Table 1). Also, women in single-parent households 
will have particularly high work burdens since 
there is no opportunity to share the work. Thus, for 
some groups of women, the amount of work 
undertaken will be relatively greater than that 
undertaken by men. It is likely that the work 
burden for many women has increased, given the 
increase in full-time/full-year work among women 
and the rise in female-headed households. 
Assessing the impact of including unpaid 
labour on trends in household inequality remains 
difficult. The recent data on unpaid work provided 
in the above-mentioned Statistics Canada 
publication, along with estimates provided by the 
Status of Women Canada's Economic Gender 
Equality Indicators, reflect an improvement in our 
conceptual understanding of the types of data 
needed to assess welfare and the relative 
contributions of men and women. Although both 
publications provide considerable disaggregation of 
the amounts of unpaid work by type of household 
and employment status, further detail particularly 
by income level is required in order to assess how 
changes in unpaid work affect the distribution of 
welfare. We turn now to consider sharing within 
household. 
THE HOUSEHOLD IS A COOPERATIVE 
AND SHARING UNIT? 
Discussions of trends in household income 
inequality tend to assume that goods and services 
purchased with income are shared equally among 
household members and, consequently, relative 
welfare within the household, for example, between 
men and women, is ignored. The failure to examine 
intra-household distribution arises from an 
assumption about the household that has three main 
elements. First, the household is viewed as a 
cooperative unit in which members care about each 
other's welfare (i.e. in the language of neoclassical 
economists, the household is assumed to maximize 
a joint utility function). Second, resources are 
allocated among household members according to 
the decisions taken by a "benevolent dictator" - the 
head of the household. "He" is assumed to allocate 
resources in an altruistic manner taking into account 
the different preferences, interests, and needs of 
household members. Third, it is assumed that 
household members' preferences are unchanging 
and determined from outside the economic system 
(i.e. in the language of neoclassical economics, the 
household's joint utility function is stable and 
exogenous). 
The assumption that goods and services are 
shared equally within the household is questionable 
given feminist critiques of the "joint utility" 
household view, evidence of unequal sharing, and 
alternative household theories. With respect to the 
view of the household as a cooperative unit, as 
Nancy Folbre (1986, 247) argues, "it is somewhat 
inconsistent to suggest that individuals who are 
entirely selfish in the market (where there are no 
interdependent utilities) are entirely 'selfless' 
within the family, where they pursue the interests 
of the collectivity."6 Evidence also indicates that 
resources are distributed unequally between males 
and females within the household. For example, in 
Asia, the ultimate indicator of unequal sharing 
within the household, namely, higher death rates 
among women compared to men, has resulted in 
millions of missing women (Jocelyn Kynch and 
Amartya Sen 1983). 
Second, the notion of a benevolent 
dictator allocating resources within the household 
is ideologically flawed and ignores the material 
basis of power which can affect allocations. Pujol's 
(1992) work on early influential economists 
highlights ideological biases in the benevolent 
dictator view of the household (a view which 
continues to be pervasive). Pujol (1992, 104) 
writes, for example, that Edgeworth in the 1920s 
assumed that men's income goes to support the 
family, while women derive no utility from paid 
work and their incomes are not used to support 
dependants. With respect to Marshall, Pujol (1992, 
139) argues that he subscribes to a Victorian 
ideology of women as wives and mothers where 
women are not economic actors, but parameters of 
the economic system. Pujol (1992, 190) further 
argues that Pigou's analysis is based upon an 
ideology in which women are "not seen as 
independent self-contained and self-determined 
human beings, but as entirely subsumed in the 
family unit, with indirect claims to economic 
support from a husband or the state, contingent on 
the performance of reproductive work." 
In contrast to the neoclassical, joint utility 
model of the household, alternative models of the 
household recognize the possibility of conflict, 
along with cooperation, as well as the existence of 
power relations within the household and the 
material basis of power which can affect welfare 
distribution within the household.7 In bargaining 
models, for example, the intra-household 
allocation of resources is determined by relative 
male and female threat points or economic power 
which is determined by wage-earning 
opportunities and social institutions, such as 
marriage laws, divorce settlements, social 
assistance, and norms. Econometric studies in both 
developing and developed countries have failed to 
support the joint utility implications, such as income 
pooling and patterns of consumption independent of 
who actually has access to incomes (Duncan 
Thomas 1990 and Shelley Phipps and Peter Burton 
1992). It is important, however, to caution against 
postulating an overly simple relationship between 
economic power and women's relative well-being 
within the household, given the continued existence 
of phenomena such as the high degree of violence 
against women and the inability of women to 
negotiate a more equitable share of domestic labour 
when working full-time in the paid labour market. 
Third, in contrast to the notion that 
preferences are stable over time and determined 
outside of the economic system, feminist 
economists, such as Elaine McCrate (1988, 237), 
postulate that individuals are "produced by social 
activity" and "can change their own preferences." 
Therefore, individuals' experiences resulting from 
the sexual division of labour and socialization 
processes may influence their preferences. Once 
preferences are viewed as being influenced by the 
economic system, changes in, for example, the 
sexual division of labour and socialization, can 
generate changes in preferences.8 
Rejecting the assumption of a cooperative 
household in which a benevolent dictator shares out 
resources equitably implies that trends in household 
income inequality cannot be easily interpreted. 
First, at a given point in time, if economic and 
social factors affect the distribution of resources 
within the household, as in a bargaining model, then 
households will exhibit different amounts of 
sharing. Thus, while it is possible to assess 
differences in real household incomes between 
households, it is not possible to indirectly make 
inferences about the relative position of women 
within households. 
Second, if resources are not shared equally 
within the household, then interpreting changes in 
household inequality over time is difficult because 
it is conceivable that a decline in real household 
income may have no adverse consequences for 
some household members, if resources are 
transferred from one member to another, for 
example, from women to men. The decline in real 
income of low-income households, as has occurred 
in Canada during the 1980s and early 1990s, may 
mean that women in these households are 
experiencing further declines in economic welfare 
beyond that anticipated by the decline in real 
household income, and therefore, the increase in 
inequality is greater than measured. However, if 
women's economic power increases relative to 
men's due to, for example, increased labour force 
participation, then it possible that greater sharing 
of resources within households may occur. 
Since trends in household inequality 
cannot be unambiguously interpreted due to lack 
of information about changes in the distribution of 
welfare within the household, we turn now to 
examine an alternative estimate of inequality, that 
of the distribution of employment earnings among 
individuals. 
WORK IS COMPENSATED BY THE 
WAGE? 
The distribution of individual 
employment earnings has received considerable 
attention, in part because the rise in earnings 
inequality has been a major contributor to the rise 
in household income inequality. The focus on 
individual earnings also has an advantage over 
household income because it does not require the 
simplifying assumption that resources are equally 
shared within the household, or that the relative 
welfare within the household remains constant 
over time. However, conventional interpretations 
of trends in earnings inequality implicitly make 
two assumptions that are questioned here. 
The first assumption is that earnings or 
the wage associated with a job compensates the 
individual for sacrificing leisure and the value of 
home production. However, compensation for a 
job includes not only earnings, but also fringe 
benefits such as pensions, health and dental 
benefits, and holidays and increasingly, other 
forms of monetary compensation such as stock 
options, bonuses, and performance pay. 
Recognizing that compensation for work 
is greater than earnings indicates that, at a given 
point in time, estimates of earnings inequality 
underestimate the degree of inequality derived from 
work. This conclusion is based on evidence that 
fringe benefits are more likely to accrue to workers 
with higher earnings (Lee Grenon and Barbara 
Chun 1997, Tables 3 and 4). Further, the increase in 
earnings inequality underestimates the increase in 
inequality of full compensation derived from work 
because there has been an increase in the proportion 
of non-standard jobs (including part-time work, 
Iimited-term contracts, hourly-based contracts, self-
employment and homework) which tend to have 
lower hourly wages and no fringe benefits. For 
example, part-time work increased from about 11 to 
17 percent of total employment between 1975 and 
1993 (Natalie Noreau 1994,25).9 The percentage of 
part-time work, however, is underestimated because 
individuals holding more than one job with 
cumulative hours greater than 30 per week are 
classified as full-time workers; notice also that 
multiple job holding has doubled between 1977 and 
1993, from 2.4 to 5.1 percent (Gary Cohen 1994, 
33). 
The second assumption is that earnings 
compensate workers for any unpleasant aspects of 
the job, such as onerous work conditions, high 
health risks, and/or insecure job duration. The 
notion that higher wages are paid to compensate 
those jobs with "extra" unpleasant aspects, however, 
is questionable, particularly when applied to many 
jobs undertaken by women. For example, are the 
work conditions of CEO's so onerous that these jobs 
require compensating differentials of millions of 
dollars? Or, as Pat Armstrong (1993,42) asks, is the 
work of collecting garbage in neat plastic bags more 
unpleasant than the work of nurses in hospitals who 
are exposed to communicable diseases, clean up 
blood and vomit, and lift heavy weights, as well as 
using their intelligence and judgment?10 
Further, the notion of the wage 
compensating individuals for unpleasant job 
characteristics is of limited value when job quality 
is deteriorating (and wages are not increasing). 
There is qualitative evidence of a decline in job 
quality arising from changes in the organization of 
work related to government cutbacks, firms' 
competitiveness strategies, and technological 
change. For example, government cutbacks, 
particularly in health and social services, have 
resulted in the deinstitutionalization of services 
and loss of government jobs and concomitant rise 
in service provision in the community and patients' 
homes by workers employed by private sector 
firms. In Nova Scotia, M . Patricia Connelly and 
Martha MacDonald's (1996) analysis shows that 
new homecare jobs, compared to the old ones, are 
more likely to be part-time jobs with variable 
hours of work, require unpaid travel time, and are 
more likely to be associated with fewer benefits 
and lower hourly wage rates. The homecare 
workers reported an increase in isolation, a 
decrease in autonomy over their work arising from 
being given a list of tasks to complete, rather than 
being able to use their own discretion about which 
tasks to undertake, and higher stress. The nature of 
jobs which are retained in the institution are also 
changed as a result of privatization and cutbacks. 
Pat Armstrong (1993, 45-6) reports that, for 
Canadian hospitals, there has been an increase in 
the use of part-time nurses, a greater fragmentation 
of tasks, with nurses having less time for caring for 
patients, a general intensification of work, and 
greater monitoring and surveillance of nurses' 
tasks. 
In the context of trade liberalization and 
facilitated by technological change, firms attempt 
to increase competitiveness by lowering labour 
costs and increasing the flexibility of their 
workforces. The competitiveness strategies have 
led to changes in the nature of work, such as the 
use of homeworkers, particularly in the labour-
intensive segments of manufacturing sector (e.g. 
garments) and service sector (e.g. data processing, 
telephone answering). Leach (1996) describes the 
costs of homework as isolation due to no or little 
contact with other workers and raised intensity of 
work due to increased (and unrealistic) quotas 
which require the use of other family members' 
labour in order to meet the quotas. 
Technological change, particularly 
computer-based automation, has had varied effects 
on the quality of jobs. While some jobs have 
become more interesting as a result of computer 
automation, others have become more routine and 
tedious, and computer technology permits greater 
personnel surveillance. In terms of job security, the 
introduction of computers is increasingly perceived 
by workers as negatively affecting their job 
security. For example, of those workers who think 
that computers have affected their jobs, in 1989, 11 
percent of workers reported that their job insecurity 
had increased as a result of the introduction of 
computers, and this percentage increased to 19 
percent in 1994 (Graham Lowe 1997, 32). 
Therefore, the rise in earnings inequality 
understates the increase in inequality among 
workers because these estimates have not accounted 
for the increased inequality in distribution of fringe 
benefits and deterioration in job quality. The rise in 
inequality is likely to be particularly pronounced for 
male workers who have experienced an increase in 
unemployment and part-time work, and declines in 
unionization. While men continue to have higher 
wages than women, and are more likely to be 
compensated for unpleasant working conditions, 
their employment outcomes have been deteriorating 
and are moving in the direction of women's lower 
standard of employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea that welfare in Canadian society 
has become more unequal in recent decades has 
been widely discussed in the economics literature 
and popular media. This paper contributes to the 
literature on inequality by highlighting the less 
frequently discussed gender dimensions of welfare. 
It is argued that the conventional estimates of trends 
in inequality are based upon simplifying 
assumptions resulting in the neglect of unpaid work 
and intra-household welfare which are of particular 
concern to women. Once these assumptions are 
rejected, interpreting trends in income inequality 
becomes much more difficult. For example, at a 
given point in time, inequality may be 
underestimated due to the neglect of inequality 
within a household; however, inequality may be 
overestimated due to the exclusion of unpaid 
labour. Changes in inequality over time are even 
more complex to interpret. 
Further, these trends in income inequality 
mask substantial changes in the patterns of work of 
men and women and their relative welfare 
positions, which are only starting to be understood. 
In the workplace, for example, there are increasing 
divisions among women who work full-time/full-
year. At the same time, the average positions of 
men and women have become more similar, in 
major part, because male workers have 
experienced a deterioration in employment 
opportunities, reflected in increases in 
unemployment and part-time work, and declining 
average real earnings. In terms of household 
welfare, we know that, on average, men have 
increased their amount of unpaid work and 
decreased the amount of paid work, and women 
adjusted their labour in the opposite fashion. 
However, the average estimates of hours worked 
mask considerable differences in total work 
burdens among groups. The work burdens of 
single women with children and full-time/full-year 
female workers with children remain very high 
relative to men's. While the recent data on unpaid 
labour is useful for assessing how households are 
adjusting to changing economic conditions, greater 
detail is still required by income level to fully 
assess changes in the distribution of welfare. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The author thanks two anonymous referees and the 
editor for their comments on the paper. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The Gini Coefficient is an estimated number ranging from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (complete inequality). 
2. For example, for full-time/full-year workers, in 1981, women earned 63 percent of men's earnings, and in 1994, women earned 70 
percent, as calculated from Table 2. The gender earnings gap increases with age and decreases with education level. 
3. See, for example, Jean Gardiner 1975, Susan Himmelweit and S. Mohun 1977, Lourdes Beneria and Gita Sen 1981, and more 
recently, Marilyn Waring 1988. 
4. Gross Domestic Product is an estimate of the final value of goods and services sold in the market in a given year. 
5. Wealth is distributed very unequally (Lars Osberg 1981). 
6. Pujol (1992,201) also notes that the assumption of altruistic household behaviour is inconsistent with the human capital assumption 
that individuals, both men and women, will invest in human capital in a self-interested way, in order to maximize their respective 
lifetime earnings. 
7. Alternatives to the joint utility view of the intra-household allocation include neoclassical economic bargaining models (Marjorie 
McElroy 1990), Sen's capability model (Sen 1985), and broader Socialist-feminist explanations (Ann Whitehead 1981; Elaine McCrate 
1987). 
8. For example, there is evidence to suggest that social institutions, such as the availability of child support payments and social 
assistance (Shelley Phipps and Peter Burton 1993) and divorce rates (Elaine McCrate 1992) do influence labour force participation. 
9. Between 1980 and 1993, the percentage ofpart-time workers who worked part-time involuntarily, that is, they would prefer full-time 
work but could not find it, rose from 18 to 35 percent (Noreau 1994, Table 1). 
10. It is also conceivable that some types of work, where the worker has autonomy, may have positive effects on health (see, for 
example, Mary Clare Lennon and Sarah Rosenfield 1992). In making this point, the intention is not to set up a dichotomy between 
work as good or bad, but to note that it may have a positive impact on well-being, separate from income. 
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T A B L E 1 
Trends in Economic Inequality {Cini Coefficient), Selected Income Definitions and Unit of Analyses, Canada, 19*1, 
1989 and 1994 
Among Households' Among Individuals2 
Market Income Income after taxes and 
transfers 
Annual Earnings 
1971 0.447 0.373 n.a. 
1981 0.439 0.351 0.4059 
1989 0.464 0.354 0.4148 
1994 0.495 0.354 0.4283 
% change 1981-94 13 I 6 
Sources: 
1. Statistics Canada, Catalogue 13-210 (1981, p. 19; 1989, p. 19; 1991, p. 36; 1994, p. 18) 
2. Calculated from the SCF Public use data (Individual file), 1981, 1989, and 1994. 
TABLE 2 
Atinaal Earnings Inequality <Glni Coefficient), fey Gender and W»rk Status, Canada, 1981,1989 and 1994 
Panel A All Workers2 
Median (1992 S) Gini Coefficient1 
Year Women Men Women Men 
1981 15538 31014 0.4178(0.0020) 0.3511 (0.0017) 
1989 16854 29993 0.4132 (0.0019) 0.3778 (0.0022) 
1994 16824 29412 0.4240 (0.0019) 0.4007 (0.0024) 
% change 1981-94 8 -5 1 14 
Panel B Full-time/full-year Workers3 
Year Women Men Women Men 
1981 23484 37297 0.2626 (0.0022) 0.2483 (0.0016) 
1989 23985 37191 0.2813 (0.0021) 0.2787 (0.0024) 
1994 26510 37722 0.2709 (0.0019) 0.2845 (0.0028) 
% change 1981-94 13 1 3 15 
1. Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated following Tomson Ogwang's (1995) jackknife method. 
2. All workers refers to individuals with positive wages and salaries, excluding self-employed workers, aged 17 to 64 years. 
3. Full-time/full-year workers refers to all workers (as defined above) who worked mostly full-time per week for more than 48 weeks 
per year. 
Source: 
Calculated from the SCF Public-use data (Individual file), 1981, 1989, and 1994. 
